

Introduction

A. A Statement of the Nature of the Attacks the Effort Required
and the Time Phases of Execution

- a. Fixed Targets
- b. Mining
- c. LOC Interdiction

Discuss the effects of this attack on the ability of the
Chinese and particularly the USSR to react in time and effectively.

B. The Physical Effects of the Attack -- Brief Statement pulled
from basic report.

OUTLINE

Probable Reactions to a Postulated
Program for Bombing North Vietnam

I. Reactions Excluding Air Responses

Text Treats:

A. DRV

- (1) Contingency planning to deal with US strikes
- (2) Impact on Ability to support war in South
- (3) Increased reliance on USSR and China
- (4) DRV Limits to Accepting Chinese help.

B. China

1. Ability and Willingness to Respond to Request for Help
 - a. Manpower
 - b. Conventional AAA
 - c. Modern Military Equipment
 - d. Materials and Supplies

C. USSR

1. Material Assistance*
2. SAM's and Modern Hardware
3. Heavy AAA ~~Equipment~~
4. Radar

* The peculiar difficulties arising from mining of the ports is discussed in Part IV.

II. Assuming an Air Response

This is a running treatment of the alternatives and the scenario is roughly as follows:

1. DRV Air response -- with US response limited to air-to-air combat only.

Consider DRV aircraft and pilot resources and the outcome of this DRV air response.

2. Chinese Provide Aircraft

Textual treatment on likely outcome and at what point the Chinese call a halt to losses.

Discuss technical level of US vs Chinese aircraft; US vs Chinese pilot skills and numbers.

3. Chinese Provide Pilots

Text on the limits to which they can or might do this

4. US Hits DRV Airfield

- a. Chinese quit

- b. They decide to run ops from Chinese fields

- (1) w/DRV aircraft

- (2) w/Chinese Aircraft

5. US Decision Problem -- Hit Chinese Airfields?

- a. If US decides not, how much will the Chinese continue to do; what type and scale of air activity will they carry on.

- b. If US does attack -- discuss the options to the Chinese: back off, move to other fields, etc. If Chinese continue we are at the last judgment discussed in Paragraph 13.

6. Chinese Naval Response

- a. Subs
- b. MTB's

III. Soviet Reaction to Air War

(a) Provide aircraft or not provide aircraft

- 1. Operating in DRV
- 2. ~~N~~ from China bases -- this galls on discussions of Soviet/
Chinese relationship -- Chinese willingness to accept Soviet planes and
crews or Soviet willingness to send them without Soviet control.

(b) Soviet ~~dx~~ decision to provide offensive weapons.

IV. Reactions to Mining of Ports

- 1. Effect on ability to maintain support
- 2. The Chinese position
- 3. Soviet and Chinese decisions and ability to counter the mining
- 4. Soviet response ~~if~~ Chinese don't allow overland transit.

5. Few port decisions